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ABSTRACT
The nineteen-fifties — a decade of civil rights litigation, Cold War intrigue, and red scare 
McCarthyism — was also a period racked with controversies over for-profit colleges and univer-
sities (FPCUs) in the United States. This paper explores the work of James Bartlett Edmonson 
and his circle of mid-twentieth-century FPCU critics. Edmonson, a School of Education dean 
at the University of Michigan during the nineteen-fifties, became one of the most prominent 
voices against what he described as “shysters” and “sheepskinners” in proprietary higher educa-
tion. His work exposing FPCU fraud, corruption, and predatory schemes at the national level 
won him allies at the National Education Association and the Federal Trade Commission. It 
also created powerful enemies among independent college associations, home study groups, 
and religiously affiliated institutions. This paper contributes to the literature by engaging with 
an underdeveloped episode in higher education history and by locating this case study within 
the emerging field of ignorance studies. Sources for this study were drawn from the James 
B. Edmonson Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; Research Division 
Collection, National Education Association, Gelman Library, George Washington University; 
and published primary source documents in state and national periodicals.
RÉSUMÉ
Les années 1950 — une décennie de litiges en matière de droits civils, d’intrigue de la Guerre 
froide, et de « peur rouge » maccarthyste — ont aussi été une période marquée par les contro-
verses sur les collèges et les universités à but lucratif (FPCU) aux États-Unis. Cet article ex-
plore le travail de James Bartlett Edmonson et son cercle de critiques des FPCU au milieu du 
20e siècle. Doyen de l’École d’éducation de l’Université du Michigan dans les années 1950, 
Edmonson est devenu l’une des voix les plus importantes contre ce qu’il qualifiait de « shys-
ters » et de « sheepskinners » dans l’éducation supérieure à but lucratif. Son travail révélant la 
fraude, la corruption et les procédés prédateurs des FPCU au niveau fédéral lui a permis de 
trouver des alliés au sein de la National Education Association et de la Federal Trade Commission. 
Il s’est également fait des ennemis puissants parmi les associations de collèges indépendants, 
les groupes d’éducation à domicile, et les établissements d’affiliation religieuse. Cet article 
contribue à la littérature en abordant un épisode méconnu de l’histoire de l’éducation supé-
rieure et en situant cette étude de cas dans le champ émergeant des études de l’ignorance. 
Les sources de cette étude sont tirées des James B. Edmonson Papers de la Bentley Historical 
Library à l’Université du Michigan; de la Research Division Collection, National Education 
Association, de la Gelman Library à l’Université George Washington; de même que de sources 
primaires publiées dans des périodiques nationaux ou d’États fédérés.
James Bartlett Edmonson enjoyed solving problems. He launched his career by work-
ing on the kind faced by high school teachers in Michigan in the 1900s and 1910s. 
During this period, he taught at the secondary school level and served as a school 
administrator. After he joined the education faculty at the University of Michigan 
in 1914 and moved into the dean’s office fifteen years later, Edmonson continued 
a career-long interest in school-based problems. As a professor and dean, he pub-
lished Problems in Secondary Education (1923), Citizenship and Occupations through 
Problems (1931), and Civics through Problems (1935). Edmonson advanced this pro-
gram of scholarship until his retirement in 1953. If the volume of correspondence 
now housed in the University of Michigan’s Bentley Historical Library is any mea-
sure, his desk was awash in problems right up to his death in 1954.1
Of all the problems Edmonson studied during his forty-eight year career in educa-
tion, the one that stirred his passions the most was the problem of for-profit colleges 
and universities (FPCUs). He spent the last decade of his life writing, presenting, and 
organizing against the sector. His final five years were spent serving as the chair of a 
National Education Association (NEA) committee “designed to correct the condi-
tions responsible for the existence of an ‘underworld’” of for-profits. As the oldest and 
best-known education association in the US, the NEA gave Edmonson a national 
platform. He leveraged that platform to raise awareness about the FPCU industry 
that, as he saw it, posed one of the greatest threats to the integrity of American higher 
education.2
Although Edmonson has recently received scholarly attention in Diploma Mills 
(2016), much of his work organizing a mid-twentieth-century campaign against for-
profits remains largely unexplored.3 He led a circle of scholars, administrators, and 
policy-makers that committed itself to raising awareness about unsavoury aspects 
of the industry, and its members didn’t mince words. Edmonson viewed the sec-
tor as shot through with owners and operators who behaved liked “sheepskinners,” 
“shysters,” and “racketeers.” Those in his circle wrote of an underworld in education 
created by such institutions. Some railed against what they considered fake colleges 
which had become prevalent in the post-war period. Others blasted the so-called 
charlatans and “psycho-phonies” who led them. Still others worried about the degrees 
for sale advertised by the rapidly expanding sector of diploma mills. In short, these 
individuals passionately believed for-profits were doing far more harm than good, 
and they were not alone. Their observations reflected a nationwide, but until recently 
overlooked, response to FPCUs in US history.4
This article on Edmonson’s campaign offers both a substantive and an interpretive 
addition to the case presented in Diploma Mills and in standard accounts of post-war 
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higher education. The substance of Edmonson and his group’s observations, as expli-
cated in this study, draws on a variety of previously unused or understudied sources. 
These sources include archival documents, government reports, and published ar-
ticles from mid-twentieth-century America. Collectively, they respond to the still 
sizable gap in the existing account of for-profit higher education history.5 Historians 
like Roger Geiger and John Thelin have touched on the general topic in their sweep-
ing narratives, but they have focused on different periods. Geiger has limited his 
analysis mostly to the rise of for-profit law and medical schools in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and Thelin has called attention to FPCUs established at the end of the twentieth 
century.6 Other scholars, like Glenn Altschuler, Stuart Blumin, and Kathleen Frydl, 
have focused on political developments in the mid-twentieth century; but they make 
no mention of Edmonson’s nationwide campaign against for-profit colleges or any 
other citizen-led responses to FPCUs in this era.7
The substance of the campaign described in this article offers a starting point 
for moving us beyond the familiar post-war narrative — the well-studied civil rights, 
Cold War, and McCarthy era struggles of the nineteen-forties and -fifties in the US. 
Edmonson’s movement against for-profits updates the narrative in ways that align 
with history of capitalism scholarship that has recently been generating substantial 
interest among historians.8 Edmonson’s group had front row seats to witness the 
white-hot expansion of the era’s FPCUs that triggered a backlash across the coun-
try.9 In response, they launched a mid-century effort — some called it national cru-
sade — to rein in these institutions.10 They wrote for scholars, policy-makers, and 
the general public to move them to action. They wrote for audiences in the US 
and abroad to widen their impact. And almost all of them wrote because they were 
scandalized by unscrupulous behaviour in the post-war for-profit sector. With the 
full extent of their national campaign missing from American mid-century histori-
ography, the Edmonson campaign adds substantive internal and external history of 
higher education perspectives.
But this article also identifies an opportunity to explore a recent interpretive break-
through left unexamined by Diploma Mills and other research on for-profit colleges. 
The interpretive framework — known as ignorance studies or, more formally, as ag-
notology — has inspired a recent burst of scholarship from a wide range of historians, 
philosophers, anthropologists, economists, linguists, and political scientists.11 Several 
key theoretical and methodological contributions made by agnotologists to date have 
appeared in the Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies.12 How scholars 
use these contributions varies from field to field, but the organizing principle has to 
do with the systematic collection and interpretation of data that advance our under-
standing of ignorance. As described in the Routledge handbook, researchers typically 
employ methods that systematically exclude certain data considered “chronically and 
eminently ignorable” because they fail to speak to existing approaches to constructing 
research questions.13 With the emergence of agnotology, researchers across the schol-
arly spectrum have come to recognize the absence of ignorance-making as a basis 
for researchable questions in their fields. As a result, scholars have begun reworking 
their methods and procedures for data collection to advance a better understanding 
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of how ignorance is produced, diffused, maintained, and regulated in society. These 
advances have been guided by agnotology’s interpretive framework, which organizes 
socially-constructed ignorance into three categories: naive (that is, not yet learned), 
passive (not yet studied), and active (deliberate and systematic).14
This article introduces Edmonson’s mid-twentieth-century campaign as an entry 
point for accessing a prime episode in the history of ignorance-making. The move-
ment led by Edmonson observed how FPCUs employed all three patterns of igno-
rance-making — naive, passive, and active — to enhance their standing, obscure their 
primary purposes, and improve their economic fortunes. Edmonson began his work 
organizing against the sector out of concern over the need to protect unsuspect-
ing or naive World War II veterans who received GI Bill support and were exposed 
to inducements from for-profit colleges. He warned state lawmakers of the need to 
overcome their resistance, or passivity, towards investigating the full extent of known 
but understudied predatory practices used by FPCUs. And Edmonson reserved his 
sharpest criticism for the actual, or active, for-profit practices he believed deliberately 
misled students, taxpayers, and government officials.
The significance of this episode and ignorance-making framework for historical 
analysis is threefold. First, it challenges historical assumptions that the GI Bill was a 
nearly unimpeachable success in the diffusion of knowledge and the democratization 
of college access. Edmonson led a nationwide campaign that suggested the opposite 
for veterans enrolled at thousands of fly-by-night FPCUs that appeared after the 
bill’s passage. Second, it replaces, at least in terms of this episode, economistic views 
about how rational, enlightened, self-interested individuals are an indispensable force 
driving markets. In the case of the mid-twentieth-century for-profit college market, 
Edmonson’s observations point to a far more profoundly important role for igno-
rance and ignorance-making in the history of capitalism. And third, it broadens the 
scope of existing agnotological research to include education as a setting worthy of ig-
norance study. This article offers an education-based point of departure for agnotolo-
gists who have gravitated towards and gained distinction for research on science and 
public policy issues, such as tobacco, asbestos, and climate change.
All three points of significance — for higher education history, history of capi-
talism, and agnotology — unfold in Edmonson’s campaign, which began with the 
enactment of the GI Bill and ended with his death in 1954. He argued from the start 
that the public could not afford to remain, as agnotologists would now describe it, 
naive, passively ignorant, or actively misled when it came to FPCUs. He took aim at 
patterns and processes of ignorance-making that he viewed as obscuring fraud and 
inherent conflicts of interest within the for-profit industry. Edmonson called atten-
tion to FPCUs by organizing a small band of collaborators and ultimately building a 
nationwide network of supporters. Although he was not the only one of his genera-
tion to mobilize others against “fraud schools,” Edmonson had his eye on enlisting 
policy-makers from coast to coast. His goal was to increase regulatory standards by 
coordinating FPCU policy in every state. Along the way, he gained a reputation for 
identifying a significant problem in higher education and spearheading a movement 
to rein in diploma mills across the country.15
Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de l’éducation4
The GI Bill and the For-Profit Sector
Edmonson launched his crusade shortly after the passage of the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, when little was known about what impact the new law 
would have on higher education. This legislation, also called the GI Bill, provided a 
way to ease the transition of World War II veterans back into civilian life. The federal 
government subsidized home mortgages, provided veterans with a monthly stipend 
for up to a year, and covered full tuition as well as living expenses for education 
and training. More than 2 million veterans went to college and another 5.5 million 
enrolled in job-skills programs through the GI Bill. Total enrolments doubled on 
campuses in the US. In the immediate post-war period, veterans accounted for as 
much as 49 per cent of the overall higher-education student body. Edmonson lived 
through a dynamic period of expansion at the University of Michigan as a result 
of the GI Bill. The campus at Ann Arbor, like virtually all other major campuses, 
faced intense pressure to meet the increased demand. As enrolments skyrocketed, the 
university had to invest heavily in creating the infrastructure necessary to handle all 
the growth. New buildings for classrooms, laboratories, and residence halls sprang 
up. New professors and programs appeared in the catalogue. The GI Bill, in short, 
provided financial support for college-going veterans and physically transformed the 
institutions they attended.16
During Edmonson’s tenure as dean of the School of Education, the University 
of Michigan benefited from the influx of new, non-traditional students. With siz-
able increases in enrolments came increases in funding and program development. 
Construction of dozens of new campus buildings got underway, and the number 
of education students alone rose by 300 per cent during the decade following the 
passage of the GI Bill. Although busy managing this growth, Edmonson worried 
about the broader impact of the GI Bill. He believed it had the potential to unleash 
a torrent of illegal and unethical behaviour in for-profit post-secondary education.17
Within months of the veteran’s bill becoming law, Edmonson fired the first salvo 
of his crusade with a publication called “Gypped! G.I. Joe Must Be Protected against 
Low-Grade Colleges.” In the article, he focused on the naïveté of veterans about for-
profit colleges and the active efforts by FPCUs to mislead prospective students about 
the industry. Edmonson warned that longstanding patterns of fraud in the sector 
were not widely known. Citing work from as early as the 1920s, he cautioned readers 
about “sheepskinners” who operated proprietary institutions without endowment, 
property, faculty, admissions requirements, or “bona fide courses, either residential 
or nonresidential.” As Edmonson saw it, these institutions had not gone away and 
the GI Bill would only make matters worse by inspiring the creation of many more 
diploma mills. He blasted for-profits for tailoring false, ignorance-producing adver-
tisements aimed at unsuspecting veterans. “Will the necessary steps be taken,” he 
asked, “to prevent returning veterans from enrolling in low-grade colleges? Unless 
prompt action is instituted, many veterans will waste their time and money in atten-
dance at so-called higher institutions from which credits are worthless. Rumors are 
abroad that some of these institutions are hoping to flourish through the enrollment 
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of veterans under the GI Bill of Rights.” The article underscored concerns that stood 
at the intersection of unsuspecting veterans and predatory for-profits.18
Edmonson’s “Gypped!” not only identified naive and active agnotological prob-
lems with FPCUs, it also revealed his concern over what we would now call passive 
forms of ignorance-making. He chided his peers in traditional higher education for 
passively ignoring the problem. By failing to take an interest in for-profits, most 
faculty and administrators of the era knew little of diploma mills and their practices. 
He also considered lax oversight of the industry as evidence of passive ignorance 
about for-profits among state-level policy-makers. These government officials, in his 
experience, tended to have some understanding of the public policy issues at stake 
but chose inaction due to competing interests. To counter this passivity, Edmonson 
recommended the establishment of standing committees that would investigate the 
“underworld of higher education.” These committees would review the qualifications 
of faculty hired by these post-secondary institutions (Did they have adequate train-
ing? Does the for-profit have a sufficient number to offer the courses advertised?). 
They would also inspect their libraries and laboratories (Do they adequately reflect 
the needs of the programs announced in their flyers? Would they fulfill the pro-
grammatic needs listed in the catalogues?). And, finally, Edmonson charged these 
proposed committees with assessing the accuracy of claims made by institutions 
about accreditation, program offerings, and transferability of credits for certification 
(Do peer institutions accept their credits? Do state licencing agencies recognize their 
graduates?). These recommendations came out of a desire to prompt scholars and 
lawmakers to learn more about diploma mills and take policy action against them.19
Through “Gypped!” Edmonson spoke directly to veterans, academics, policy-
makers, and FPCU operators. He wanted to inspire the public to demand improved 
for-profit college regulations at the state level. While the article outlined a call to ac-
tion, he later discovered that state officials barely noticed. What Edmonson did not 
know at the time, however, was that “Gypped!” would become the starting point for 
his nearly decade-long crusade against fraudulent for-profits.20
During the four-year period after “Gypped!” was written, government reports and 
increasing levels of litigation began to confirm Edmonson’s early warnings about the 
FPCU industry’s rapid expansion and ignorance-making strategies. There were less 
than 2,000 for-profits operating in the US the year president Roosevelt signed the 
GI Bill into law. By the end of the decade, that number had ballooned to more than 
7,500. Thousands of brand-new institutions appeared virtually overnight, taking of-
ficials at the state and federal level by surprise.21 Policy-makers in states like Illinois, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere 
reported on an escalating number of complaints within their borders. Citizens’ 
groups in Illinois had long demanded action against proprietary schools that peddled 
poor instruction through misrepresentation as well as “questionable contracts and ex-
orbitant fees.” These were places where naive students were being victimized because 
of inaction and passivity among lawmakers.22 Officials in Maryland, meanwhile, wit-
nessed a significant uptick in fraud activity as nearby states tightened regulations 
on for-profits. Reports from Massachusetts described having already contended with 
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“several flagrant examples of such abuses.”23 And New Jersey state education officials 
began experiencing difficulty keeping pace with “many malpractices on the part of 
private trade schools.”24 Cases in New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania all followed 
a similar pattern: poor quality instruction, false claims and misrepresentation, and 
repeated complaints filed by unsuspecting students and taxpayers.25
When the for-profit industry’s boom reached New Mexico, regulators there de-
cided not to act. Despite receiving complaints from its citizens, the state passively ig-
nored the issue. According to New Mexico’s Board of Educational Finance, the state 
had “no machinery for the control or supervision of private degree-granting institu-
tions.” Although the agency was aware of illegal FPCU practices, officials declined to 
investigate further and decided “there is nothing that can be done until the Federal 
Trade Commission finds some point at which it can take hold of the case.” Since 
the GI Bill had left supervision of these institutions to state agencies and lawmakers, 
each state determined how much they would allocate towards FPCU oversight. For 
citizens of New Mexico during this era, those resources never appeared.26
While state agencies struggled to keep up with complaints and supervisory ex-
penses, members of Congress passed amendments to the GI Bill in 1946 and 1949 
to curb well-known FPCU abuses. The amendments targeted on-the-job training 
fraud, misuse of GI Bill funds, and poor quality instruction. They also removed “avo-
cational or recreational” studies from the list of approved GI Bill-funded programs.27
To Edmonson, government responses to the FPCU industry’s expansion and 
ignorance-making abuses were too little and too late. Thousands of newly-created 
institutions now held a substantial place in the higher education landscape. With GI 
Bill funds in their pocket, millions of students attended, wanted to attend, or were 
alleged to attend these institutions. Tens of millions of taxpayer dollars now went to-
wards the for-profit sector, either directly, through student enrolments, or indirectly, 
by way of new state-level supervisory expenditures. Given state government reports 
of the late nineteen-forties, illegal behaviour and ignorance-making strategies coming 
from the for-profit sector were no longer hypothetical, as Edmonson described it in 
“Gypped!” States now had to respond to cases of FPCU fraud against unsuspecting 
veterans and public coffers. But with each state devising its own regulatory frame-
work, an uneven collection of policies began to emerge. Despite growing recognition 
of FPCU problems, right through to the end of the decade no one had yet come 
forward to lead an effort to coordinate the design, development, and implementation 
of for-profit college policies at the state level.28
Edmonson decided to take a shot at it in 1949. By then, he had gained some at-
tention for identifying how fraud and ignorance played out for veterans, states, and 
the FPCU sector. The “Gypped!” article had, during the late nineteen-forties, at-
tracted a growing professional and popular readership. The Association of American 
Colleges (AAC) circulated it to its membership, which comprised six hundred liberal 
arts colleges. AAC representatives had a vested interest in the problem of fake insti-
tutions of higher education and likely gave Edmonson’s work a sympathetic read-
ing. Guy Snavely, executive director of the association, encouraged his colleagues to 
learn all they could about for-profits. “These schools are not interested in veterans,” 
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warned Snavely, “they just want his $500 [approximately $6,500 in current dollars].” 
The Edmonson article also appeared in the New York Times as part of a story on fake 
colleges. It cited “Gypped!” when discussing how for-profits “wait to mulct G.I. stu-
dents” by taking advantage of their naïveté.29
While stepping up his campaign, Edmonson learned of others committed to rais-
ing awareness about how the FPCU industry benefited from multiple levels of igno-
rance. Francis J. Brown, a New York University sociology professor and member of 
the American Council on Education (ACE), presented and published on the liabili-
ties that would result from remaining naive about the sector. Brown warned about 
the rash of new FPCUs founded to exploit veterans. The ACE consultant called out 
commercial colleges for receiving $500 for so-called intensive programs that ran for 
six weeks. Brown concluded that it was no accident the FPCU fee of $500 matched 
the total allowable tuition stipend given annually to veterans through the GI Bill. 
The American Medical Association (AMA) pursued FPCUs as well, creating a special 
committee to warn state governors of the need to investigate unscrupulous for-profit 
medical schools. Members of the AMA expressed special concern about lobbying ef-
forts underway from the sector that ignored medical training standards. They antici-
pated that unqualified proprietary schools would advance strategies designed to win 
state-level recognition and the approval necessary to gain access to GI Bill funding. 
Edmonson kept a file on these kinds of concerns expressed about the for-profit indus-
try. He knew that the AAC, AMA, ACE, and New York Times all shared a common 
interest in raising awareness of the potential dangers posed by FPCUs.30
What was still missing, however, according to Edmonson, was a coordinated ef-
fort across states designed to address the naïveté of veterans, passivity of state law-
makers, and active predatory practices of the for-profit sector. The lack of regulatory 
uniformity throughout the country made it difficult to rein in diploma mills. These 
institutions could move from state to state in search of favourable — meaning weak 
or non-existent — regulatory environments. Edmonson wanted to know how each 
state intended to handle these institutions. He had a hunch, based on reports and 
correspondence, that only a few had penalties for FPCU operators guilty of false ad-
vertising and ignorance-producing misrepresentations. These operators could make 
unfounded claims about program offerings and employment prospects to prospec-
tive students with little or no consequence. For these reasons, Edmonson turned his 
attention to state level officials who had taken a passive, or lax, to use his word, ap-
proach to chartering and monitoring FPCUs. He assumed most states did not know 
where to begin.31
The Crusade’s National Committee
In 1949, Edmonson took his ideas about the FPCU problem to the National 
Education Association (NEA). As one of the oldest professional organizations in the 
US, the NEA offered a well-established national platform. The association, origi-
nally founded as the National Teachers Association in the 1840s and renamed in the 
1870s, received a charter from Congress in 1906. As the organization’s membership 
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increased during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the NEA moved to 
Washington, DC, and created a Representative Association drawn from members 
of professional associations at the state and local level. Through the Representative 
Association, the NEA maintained a far-reaching network of associates and com-
manded the attention of educators across the country. The organization established a 
loyal base of support by conducting studies on teacher salaries, school finances, school 
taxation, and general federal aid. These studies were designed to improve education 
throughout the US. By the time Edmonson approached the NEA in 1949, the as-
sociation had expanded beyond its original role of serving elementary and secondary 
education interests. He reached out to Ralph McDonald, the executive secretary of 
the NEA’s higher education department, to make a case for why the country needed 
leadership in the matter of for-profits.32
Through McDonald, Edmonson sent a proposal to the NEA that touched on 
all three forms of socially constructed ignorance involving for-profits. By proposing 
a Committee for the Protection of Youth and Adults against Fraudulent Schools 
and Colleges, Edmonson suggested that there was a need to protect unsuspecting 
prospective college students, whom he recognized as naive about FPCUs. He recom-
mended protections that involved prodding state lawmakers to learn more about 
for-profit fraud and to implement policies to counter it. The ultimate goal of the 
committee would be to legislate away the kind of active ignorance-making strate-
gies used by the FPCU sector to advertise and misrepresent their offerings to vet-
erans. McDonald took the message forward, and two key members of the NEA’s 
higher education division supported the measure: Samuel Miller Brownell of Yale 
University and Earl Anderson of Ohio State University. Both wanted to see the com-
mittee launch a national investigation into FPCUs that would yield state-level policy 
recommendations. The president of the NEA’s higher education division, J. Kenneth 
Little of the University of Wisconsin, approved the proposal and invited Edmonson 
to serve as chair of the renamed Committee on Fraudulent Schools and Colleges. 
By the end of the year, Edmonson had agreed to chair the committee, the NEA had 
assigned the rest of the committee’s membership, and the decade defined by World 
War II had come to a close.33
McDonald recommended taking a few months before calling the first commit-
tee meeting, but Edmonson chose not to wait that long. In the second week of 
January 1950, Edmonson gathered his team in Washington, DC, and got to work 
during a two-day planning session. Five others joined Edmonson: Frank Hubbard, 
Paul Ellicker, Worth McClure, John D. Russell, and William L. Pencke. At the time, 
Hubbard served as director of the NEA’s research division; he brought investiga-
tion resources to the table. Ellicker and McClure both came from school administra-
tion organizations. Ellicker was the executive secretary of the National Association 
of Secondary School Principals. McClure held the same office in the American 
Association of School Administrators. What they brought was access to organized 
audiences that dealt with state-level education policy. Russell held an appointment 
in the US Office of Education. He could speak to trends in education policy at the 
national level.34
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Of the five members attending the first meeting, however, Pencke would become 
Edmonson’s most important collaborator. As a trial attorney for the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), he had years of experience litigating against for-profits. This 
experience led Pencke to call the sector “a cancerous growth on the body of educa-
tion.” In one of Pencke’s cases, an FPCU owner — whose only educational credential 
was a bachelor’s degree earned from Princeton before the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury — taught all the classes and claimed the state had officially approved the institu-
tion. A Court of Appeals came to the opposite conclusion: “The petitioner’s school 
is neither a university nor an institute. It has no entrance requirements, no resident 
students, no library, no laboratory, and no faculty. It has no one teaching anything.” 
In another case, a college stated that “anybody can do that” when probed about the 
qualifications of its faculty in the area of architecture. With a good education, anyone 
“could teach the methods given in the textbooks.” Pencke’s FTC caseload had increased 
exponentially in the late nineteen-forties, and, as he saw it, the Edmonson committee 
could bring much-needed national attention to FPCU fraud. With Pencke’s experi-
ence investigating for-profits, Edmonson would come to rely on him for information 
about specific institutions and ongoing litigation.35
Pencke not only brought legal experience to the committee, but also shared 
Edmonson’s three-part vision of the ignorance-based problem with the for-profit in-
dustry: naive students, passive lawmakers, and active FPCU owners and managers. 
When describing the students attracted to diploma mills, he described them as unin-
formed about the strategies of unscrupulous operators. The naïveté among American 
citizens and foreign students made them easy prey for those looking at establishing 
profitable businesses. His comments about state lawmakers echoed those of Edmonson 
as well. State and federal investigations had exposed many rackets from time to time, 
but lawmakers had failed to learn about the breadth and depth of the problem. Too 
many states, according to Pencke, passively ignored how many of these fraudulent 
institutions received charters within their boundaries and whether non-profit char-
ters had been used to advance for-profit aims. While “moneys [were] being applied to 
the salaries” of college operators, states ignored whether these institutions produced 
evidence of financial responsibility, proper equipment, or “adequate buildings, labo-
ratories, libraries, [and] a faculty of learned men possessing degrees from recognized 
universities and colleges and fully qualified to teach the subjects in which instruction 
is offered.” As for diploma mills, Pencke depicted their business model as organized 
around deliberately and systematically deceiving prospective students through “skill-
ful advertisements and even more artfully composed catalogs.” Together, these ele-
ments — with students, lawmakers, and for-profits at the centre — created a maelstrom 
of ignorance that allowed “degree merchants,” as Pencke called them, to flourish.36
When Edmonson called Pencke and the rest of the NEA team together for their 
first meeting, committee members quickly learned what the chair brought to the ef-
fort: more than forty years of experience in education and a passion for finding a uni-
fying solution to FPCU problems. At the start of the meeting, Edmonson distributed 
a twenty-point list outlining the committee’s objectives. All of these points fell under 
two broad goals.37
Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de l’éducation10
The committee’s first goal, he argued, was to counter widespread naïveté about 
for-profits. His first objective along these lines was to enlist the support of educa-
tors and members of professional education organizations. Edmonson wanted the 
committee to acquaint educators with effective ways of marshalling the services of 
such agencies as the FTC to process FPCU complaints. He also envisioned dissemi-
nating information to variety of groups — academic, professional, corporate, and 
civic — based on reports coming from state agencies about for-profit fraud, exploita-
tion, and false advertising. His goal was to mobilize support from colleges, employ-
ers, and education associations at the state, regional, and national levels by calling at-
tention to fake degrees. By doing this, Edmonson hoped to cultivate support among 
those in a position to advise students against enrolling in diploma mills, including 
high school counsellors and principals. Moreover, he included religious organiza-
tions among his list of potential allies. Edmonson had in mind the Federal Council 
of Churches and the American Association of Theological Schools. Given reluctance 
at the state level towards regulating religious organizations, for-profit theological 
schools had a particularly bad reputation. Edmonson believed established religious 
and theological organizations could play an important role in cleaning up the sector. 
Through each of these objectives, he focused the committee’s attention on build-
ing relationships to diffuse information across the country and increase the public’s 
understanding of FPCUs.38
In addition to countering naïveté and lack of awareness, Edmonson described the 
committee’s second goal: overcoming passivity in state-level policy action. To this 
end, he explained the need for a comprehensive study of higher education policies 
in each state. Edmonson wanted the committee to clarify the comparative differ-
ences that existed between states when it came to laws and regulations designed to 
handle fraud schools. With such a study in hand, the committee could then assist 
states in identifying weaknesses in their legal and regulatory frameworks. By sharing 
what other states had done to combat FPCU fraud, he believed states with weaker 
oversight could easily make improvements. The committee’s next few action steps 
would centre on drafting and circulating model legislation for state governments to 
adopt. He wanted to simplify the process for state lawmakers to propose, pass, and 
enact laws that would drive predatory institutions out of existence. The commit-
tee’s remaining tasks — publishing in education journals, enlisting the monitoring 
support of the Better Business Bureau, expanding the use of the US Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s services, requesting regular reports from 
state officials about fraud policies, and warning foreigners about diploma mills — all 
shared a common ring of optimism. For Edmonson, it was just a matter of overcom-
ing ignorance — the naive and passive kind — before states could bring predatory 
institutions to justice.39
Edmonson’s drive, goals, and objectives energized the committee. Hubbard com-
mitted crucial resources from the NEA’s research division so they could immediately 
begin a survey of state policies. Ellicker and McClure expressed a strong interest 
in meeting with members of their organizations to discuss the for-profit problem. 
Russell enlisted the support of the Office of Education, where agency officials had 
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already compiled a file on “bogus institutions.” And Pencke took the lead in draft-
ing model legislation to distribute to chief school officers, state legislators, and civic 
groups. The energy coming from the committee gave Edmonson reason to believe the 
tide would to turn in their favour. For five years, the for-profit sector had benefited 
from a combination of unsuspecting students, easy GI Bill money, and a lax policy 
environment. Together, these elements allowed opportunists to generate a boom in 
the for-profit college market. Edmonson saw the NEA committee as a way to slow 
down or, more optimistically, roll back the expansion of dubious FPCUs.40
As word spread about the NEA’s newly established Edmonson Committee, a national 
network of allies and supporters began to form to warn the public about for-profits and 
their ignorance-making strategies. William S. Carlson, president of the University of 
Delaware, contacted the committee about fraud rampant on the east coast. He ap-
plauded Edmonson for addressing the “growing menace of ‘diploma mills.’ ” W. F. 
Dyde, vice-president and dean of the faculty at the University of Colorado Boulder, 
reported on for-profit fraud in the Rockies. He alerted Edmonson to scam artists at the 
nearby National University and National Research Institute. Howard H. Pattee, ex-
ecutive secretary of the California Association of Independent Schools, expressed sup-
port for the committee. Even though his group represented private non-profit schools, 
Pattee understood the need to curb abuses at the post-secondary for-profit level. On 
the religious front, church leaders across the country came forward and identified po-
tentially fraudulent programs. A leader of the First Baptist Church in Dixon, Missouri, 
had doubts about the College of Divine Metaphysics in Indiana and wondered if it was 
“one of the questionable kind.” A superintendent of missions at the Lutheran Synod 
of Pittsburgh asked the same about Pike’s Peak Bible Seminary. The sheer number of 
fly-by-night for-profit theological seminaries, however, made it particularly difficult for 
the committee to keep track of this part of the sector.41
Edmonson read these and other queries from across the US as the start of a broad-
based movement against problem FPCUs. The volume of correspondence he received 
suggested that the committee had struck a national nerve. Those who contacted 
Edmonson and his team frequently asked for advice on how to file claims against for-
profit institutions. For a time, the committee attempted to compile a list of diploma 
mills drawn from these complaints. Edmonson would use the list to conduct an 
initial screening of the worst offenders, and Pencke would follow up with suggestions 
on potential legal action. Between the two of them, they mobilized local, state, and 
national contacts to collect more information. Through the FTC and other agencies, 
they initiated efforts to shut down predatory institutions.42
Within months of the committee’s inaugural meeting, Edmonson had reason to 
celebrate the progress made on their first goal of reducing naïveté and increasing 
public awareness about for-profits. I. L. Kandel, editor of the national education 
journal School and Society, commended Edmonson for bringing needed attention to 
proprietary institutions. “Your committee should know,” Kandel stated, “how much 
damage fake institutions are doing to the reputation of American education abroad.” 
When Edmonson offered to write an announcement for the journal, Kandel ex-
pressed strong interest in publishing it. Once in hand, the editor considered the piece 
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so important that he decided to give it “first place in the issue to be published.” The 
announcement, titled “Fraudulent Schools and Colleges” appeared in 1950, and gave 
Edmonson an opportunity to offer advice and promote the cause of the committee. 
He advised prospective college students to select a reputable institution by consulting 
local employers about proprietary trade and vocational schools. He walked readers 
through recent reports of scandals and fraud, and he shared with them the kind of 
claims that should raise flags for prospective students. “The fraudulent trade schools 
have many deceptive tricks,” he warned, “such as ‘short cuts’ and the promise of an 
attractive position for which few persons could qualify. Others offer short cuts for 
certificates and misrepresent the opportunities for employment. In general, any trade 
school that promises short cuts or employment for prospective students should be 
viewed with suspicion.” Edmonson also asked readers to help keep track of “gyp” 
institutions. The call to action came with instructions on how to contact committee 
members as well as agencies like the FTC about predatory institutions.43
Around the time the School and Society article was published, leaders of large-
scale organizations became aware of the Edmonson Committee and contacted its 
members directly for help. George L. Johnson, president of the Baptist Foundation 
in Illinois, turned to Edmonson for advice on doctoral level studies. Given the ex-
panding claims against proprietaries, Johnson wanted an opinion about whether one 
of the foundation’s institutions — Southern Illinois College of the Bible — should 
consider offering a doctoral program. Harold B. Baker, chairman of the business 
administration division for General Motors, also reached out to Edmonson from 
Michigan. He “noted with interest” the NEA committee’s work on the troubled for-
profit sector of higher education. Baker wondered if Edmonson’s team could assist 
GM with employment applications received by the company. The car executive had 
seen potentially fraudulent degree claims — as high as the PhD — cross his desk. 
A similar story came from Captain Harry F. Gay of the March Air Force Base in 
California. As with the other queries, Gay needed guidance in separating the wheat 
from the chaff. “Several of my men,” he suspected, “have Degrees from Colleges that 
I believe are questionable.” All of these requests reminded Edmonson and his NEA 
colleagues of the need to continue making headway in their efforts to reduce naïveté 
about FPCUs. Widespread abuses by the for-profit sector had become a destabilizing 
force in American religious, corporate, and military life.44
As the Edmonson Committee made progress on the first goal of the crusade — rais-
ing public awareness — they also made breakthroughs on the second goal of promot-
ing policy action. As promised, Hubbard devoted resources from the research divi-
sion at NEA to complete a nationwide survey of state boards of education. Results 
from the survey gave them insight into the level of passive ignorance maintained by 
policy-makers about what they knew about for-profits, what they wanted to know 
about the institutions, and what they needed to know in order to respond to them 
in their states (Table 1). The responses received by the committee indicated that the 
situation was worse than anticipated. According to Edmonson, no other major coun-
try was as lax as the US in allowing “shyster” schools and diploma mills to sell their 
degrees to unsuspecting students.45
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Table 1 
NEA Nationwide Survey of Forty-Eight State-Level Departments of Education 
(January 1953)
Sample Survey Questions Responses
Is a charter or licence required before an educational 
institution can operate in your state at the college level?
16 = No
Does a state agency or committee prepare a list of 
approved colleges of your state?
13 = No
To your knowledge, are there any non-accredited colleges 
in your state that offer master’s or doctor’s degrees by 
correspondence in such fields as religion, psychology, 
psychiatry, or nature healing?
7 = Yes
Does your state have adequate laws or regulations for 
closing low-grade institutions, especially “diploma mills”?
17 = No
5 = No reply
Does your state require all higher education institutions, 
except those accredited by a regional or state agency, to 
file with your office copies of catalogues, announcements 
or degrees, and course requirements?
32 = No
3 = No reply
Does the problem of low-grade schools exist in your 
state?
10 = Yes
5 = No reply
Which of the following services, if any, might your office 
desire from the NEA Association for Higher Education in 
efforts to close low-grade institutions? (Types of services 
are indicated by the replies.) 
22 = Lists of LG schools
28 = Plans for eliminating 
LG schools in other states
29 = Effective legislation
27 = Procedures for college 
accreditation in other states
Note: LG = Low Grade/Fraud Colleges.
Source: James B. Edmonson, “Responsibility for Diploma Mills,” Higher Education  
(January 1954): 88–89.  
The survey’s findings confirmed that overcoming passivity at the state level and co-
ordinating for-profit higher education policy would pose a significant challenge. The 
majority of survey respondents knew they were largely ignorant about what other 
states were doing to address FPCU problems. At the same time, respondents ex-
pressed an interest in filling this known gap in what they knew. Officials in seventeen 
states mentioned that improving legislation to prevent the operation of low-grade 
colleges was both desirable and feasible. These same officials, however, noted that 
their offices had little or no control over the granting of charters or licences. The gap 
between what these officials knew and what they wanted to know inspired Edmonson 
to work closely with Pencke in drafting a legislative blueprint for lawmakers to spon-
sor at the state level. The blueprint proposed stricter state laws and regulations, par-
ticularly with for-profit college licensing, chartering, and advertising. It also proposed 
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laws that demanded evidence of the value of non-accredited colleges and universities. 
The goal was to produce a political culture willing to shame diploma mills. But 
Edmonson believed none of the laws would work without implementing the most 
important recommendation of all: increased and aggressive state-level prosecution of 
owners and operators of fraudulent institutions. He recommended that states should 
begin filing criminal charges against “sheepskinners” and “shysters.” Without putting 
offenders in jail, he believed, predatory practices would continue.46
As they worked to reduce public naïveté and overcome state policy inaction, 
Edmonson and his committee could have enlisted the support of accrediting agen-
cies. Instead, they chose to communicate directly with state governments, because 
accreditation was not the central problem. Reports received by the committee from 
across the country indicated that non-accredited for-profit colleges aggressively re-
cruited veterans with their GI Bill funding. For-profits targeted GIs who knew little 
about the difference between accredited and non-accredited colleges. For these rea-
sons, Edmonson chose to focus on states — their legislators and education agencies. 
They alone had the authority to close problematic, non-accredited FPCUs that had 
successfully advertised their way into the GI Bill market. The NEA survey had shown 
that “most of the State educational officials do not have much information regarding 
nonaccredited higher institutions,” but that they wanted “evidence of the value of 
degrees and certificates issued by nonaccredited institutions.” Accrediting agencies 
could help with lobbying states for stricter laws, but not with the passing or enforce-
ment of the laws themselves.47
With state officials in mind, the Edmonson Committee turned its attention to-
wards creating a model bill that would protect unsuspecting veterans and mobilize 
lawmakers. It did not take them long, and the bill they circulated received favour-
able responses from executives at the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 
the American Council on Education, and the National Association and Council 
of Business Schools. These executives appreciated the “high contribution” it made 
towards eliminating “fake colleges,” and they applauded the “general objective.”48 
Others who learned about the effort from abroad wanted to know more. A German 
official, for instance, wrote to the committee asking for advice on how Europeans 
should distinguish between a diploma mill and a legitimate institution. Were there 
no laws, like there were in Europe, protecting citizens from unsanctioned institu-
tions? This was no trivial question. By the start of the nineteen-fifties, the number of 
for-profits that had received Veterans Administration (VA) approval hovered around 
9,000. A full two-thirds of these had been established as a result of the GI Bill during 
the five-year period after its passage.49
The model bill, nevertheless, received a cold reception from other groups. Among 
the staunchest critics were those from Bible colleges and theological institutions. 
Many, cautioned one of Edmonson’s supporters, are “associated with off-brand 
religious denominations and seek refuge in their constitutional rights of religious 
freedom when attacked in the courts.”50 Fort Wayne Bible College fit such a de-
scription. The college’s president, S. A. Witmer, thought the bill was too restric-
tive and not conducive to the “right of propagating religious faith.” He appealed to 
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“freedoms inherent in our democracy” as the reason for his resistance to penalties 
against and supervision of religiously affiliated for-profits. He called Edmonson’s bill 
“un-American and undemocratic,” at a time when such accusations caught the atten-
tion of people like US Senator Joseph McCarthy. Religious liberty, as Edmonson’s 
circle of colleagues had warned, protected fraudulent institutions and provided them 
with a constitutional defence against attempts to eliminate them. Religiously affili-
ated for-profit colleges might have defended their institutions as expressions of faith 
protected by the First Amendment, but Edmonson was a skeptic. He had received 
an overwhelming number of allegations about profit-driven colleges defrauding stu-
dents looking for religious instruction. It was among the most common complaints 
Edmonson received. Ignorance-making in these cases operated on multiple levels: 
naïveté among the public about how the principle of religious liberty could protect 
unscrupulous proprietary institutions; passivity among national religious organiza-
tions and state agencies about the need to monitor or regulate the sector; and ac-
tive ignorance-making by proprietors about their institutional offerings, facilities, 
and faculty. Edmonson fought what he saw as abuses of religious freedom by ap-
pealing to mainstream organizations like the American Association of Theological 
Schools. But he and his circle continued to receive a disproportionate number of 
letters about short-lived, off-brand religious colleges that based their right to exist on 
the constitution.51
Despite opposition from religious quarters, Edmonson’s campaign against for-
profits continued to increase awareness about the FPCU sector. According to the 
American Council on Education, Edmonson had aroused the public’s interest in “the 
danger of this vicious ‘racket.’” A flood of correspondence came to the committee 
from professors, college administrators, state officials, regional accreditors, military 
officers, journal editors, and agents of philanthropic organizations across the country. 
For the most part, they wrote asking about suspected diploma mills or, more gener-
ally, about any lists the committee had of fraudulent institutions. These individuals 
wanted to know if their local institution, often a Bible college or religiously affiliated 
FPCU, was worthy of the name college or university; or they wanted a complete, na-
tionwide accounting of fraudulent institutions so they could identify those located in 
their state and region; or they simply wanted to show their support for the commit-
tee’s work and join them in their effort to curb such institutions, as some expressed 
it. At the time, these individuals and organizations were not sure who else to turn to 
for this information. And that was a motivating factor driving Edmonson’s campaign. 
The problem — the absence of any formal, timely, and comprehensive data about 
untrustworthy for-profits — left the public and policy-makers blind, ignorant, and 
without guidance.52
Between 1950 and 1952, the Edmonson Committee received a strong tailwind 
from a series of federal investigations into FPCUs and their ignorance-making prac-
tices. The VA published a two hundred-page report that identified FPCUs as the 
source of 78 per cent of GI Bill fraud and deception against the federal government. 
Such reports led to the closure of hundreds of institutions. The VA identified hun-
dreds more as unacceptable. More than a thousand of these schools reduced their 
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tuition fees when asked to disclose financial information. The investigations resulted 
in enforcement at the national level that recovered millions of fraudulently acquired 
GI Bill dollars. “There is no doubt,” VA officials concluded, “that veterans’ education 
has been an extremely lucrative and profitable enterprise for certain types of business 
men… [in the] education and training of veterans for which honest value is not being 
received.”53 A similar report came from a US House of Representatives committee 
assigned to study the use of GI Bill funds for education. The congressional report 
they produced blamed weak regulations and enforcement on the spread of for-profit 
abuses. Approximately half of a sampling of institutions — consisting of more than 
six hundred proprietary colleges — engaged in illegal practices. Even more turned up 
evidence of questionable activities. “Exploitation by private schools,” House commit-
tee members stated, “has been widespread.”54
During this two-year period, the Edmonson Committee continued to work on its 
second charge of overcoming passivity at the state level and facilitating legislative ac-
tion. The federal investigations, and the headlines they made, inspired the committee 
to redouble its efforts with state governments. But the committee needed funding. 
Edmonson and his team had relied on modest support from the NEA to sponsor a 
meeting or two per year. Funds allocated by the NEA’s research division had dried up 
after the state policy survey was completed. As a result, members of this committee 
personally absorbed costs for their time, effort, travel, and supplies.55
Edmonson recognized the problem, and he came up with a plan to fund their 
campaign against ignorance-making produced by the era’s for-profit colleges. At the 
end of May 1952, he called on Alvin Eurich, vice-president of the Ford Foundation’s 
Fund of the Advancement of Education, for support. “Our committee,” his request 
began, “is not able to make a vigorous drive against ‘gyp’ institutions because of a lack 
of funds. At present we have funds for an annual meeting of our Committee but lack 
money for the implementation of an effective program.” Edmonson then went on to 
outline what his team had left to do. With Ford Foundation support, the committee 
would meet with higher education accreditors, create and distribute public service 
announcements about “shyster” colleges, counter FPCU lobbying work at the state 
level, and conduct investigations into egregious for-profit abuse cases. In other words, 
Edmonson asked for help to continue working against public naïveté and state policy 
passivity. To cover travel and material expenses, he asked Eurich for a grant of ap-
proximately $25,000. Edmonson had considered asking for $160,000, but he went 
with a safer, almost sure-bet figure.56
The plan failed. Eurich’s reply was gracious, but clear: “Certainly some effort 
should be made to close these institutions… all of us are impressed with the need to 
close ‘shyster’ schools.” But funding the Edmonson Committee would be a bridge too 
far. The Ford Foundation’s mission was one of improving and strengthening reputable 
systems of education, not of attacking or undermining disreputable ones. Citing the 
Flexner Report and its early twentieth-century study of medical education, Eurich 
justified the decision by stating that poor quality institutions “were forced to close 
because of the greatly improved programs in other schools. It is this approach that we 
are pursuing.” The Ford Foundation’s reply dampened the committee’s prospects.57
17James Bartlett Edmonson and the Mid-Twentieth-Century Crusade against For-Profit Colleges: 
An Episode of Ignorance-Making in the United States 
Edmonson and his colleagues, however, pressed on. Despite the lack of funds, 
they continued to make a personal investment in the campaign against for-profit 
college fraud. For the next two years, following his exchange with Eurich, the com-
mittee continued to distribute information to a national network of concerned edu-
cators, state officials, and lawmakers. Through these efforts, they could count several 
victories on their side of the ledger. They had raised public awareness about problem 
for-profits. They had conducted a comprehensive survey of state FPCU policies and 
practices. And they had drafted model legislation for lawmakers to introduce at the 
state level, where Edmonson believed the battle would be won or lost. “There is a 
great need,” he believed, “for strengthening the legislation in most States so as to pro-
tect the public against the tricky and corrupt practices of diploma mills.” The com-
mittee, moreover, had rallied a national network of allies around the goal of eliminat-
ing proprietary fraud and abuse. Edmonson created a pipeline of information that 
ran directly from this network to the FTC, where institutions were considered for 
investigation and prosecution.58
Conclusion
Despite its victories, Edmonson’s mid-twentieth-century campaign against predatory 
FPCUs came to an abrupt end in 1954. Edmonson, by then in his seventies, died that 
year. With him went a one-man crusade, as Arthur Adams, president of the American 
Council on Education, put it. Without its chair to lead the crusade, the progress 
made by the NEA committee dissipated. Edmonson had started working on the 
problem of for-profits around the time Congress passed the GI Bill of 1944, and he 
lived long enough to establish a national campaign against the FPCU sector’s worst 
offenders. He also lived to see his three main predictions realized, those about the 
naïveté of veterans, the passivity of state lawmakers, and the active strategies used by 
for-profits to defraud the public. What he could not have predicted, and what he did 
not live to see, were the proposals made by Congress a decade later to expand federal 
student aid programs to all prospective college students. The Higher Education Act 
(HEA) of 1965, as it became known, was at first silent on the matter of for-profits. 
But it later became the single most significant economic boon in for-profit college 
history.59
The lessons learned by Edmonson, his committee, and their national network 
of contacts about student aid for veterans disappeared long before the era of the 
HEA. If these policy lessons had survived, lawmakers might have avoided repeating 
past mistakes when making aid available to the for-profit sector. The 1972 HEA 
reauthorization opened this Pandora’s box by giving “proprietary” college students 
access to subsidized programs.60 But the lessons learned earlier were nowhere to be 
found, and the safeguards preventing the next boom in diploma mill expansion never 
materialized. As if reciting pages out of Edmonson’s original “Gypped!” article, later 
generations have warned of large-scale fraud in the FPCU sector. Bill Bennett, the US 
secretary of education in the late nineteen-eighties, commissioned an investigation 
into for-profits in an era when multiple hundred million-dollar FPCU schemes were 
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making headlines. He found the investigation’s results conclusive. “Exploitative and 
deceitful practices,” he discovered, “characterize too many proprietary institutions.”61 
In the nineteen-nineties, US Senator Sam Nunn came to the same conclusion after 
leading another series of studies into and hearings about the industry. The results 
showed Nunn that all that was needed was to “throw a dart at the board” to find a 
huge scandal.62 The same story was repeated again in the first decade of the twenty-
first century with federal investigations led by US Senator Tom Harkin. “I continue 
to be amazed by the questionable, and sometimes outright illegal, practices occurring 
within the for-profit sector,” he described. “Critics say that it is only a few bad apples, 
but we need to take a hard look at the entire orchard.”63
What the Edmonson campaign offers is substantive insight into an overlooked 
chapter in the history of higher education. It complicates standard assumptions 
about the GI Bill as a democratizing force in higher education by shifting attention 
to for-profit college fraud. The campaign identified recurring patterns of FPCU 
abuses that appeared long before the investigations of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. The perspectives — internal (that is, committee work) and 
external (the public’s responses) — derived from Edmonson’s circle underscore the 
need to recast well-worn assumptions about the GI Bill’s successes in diffusing col-
lege access.64 They also remind us of the opportunity to explore the interplay among 
education, profits, regulation, and public activism. During the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the public’s unease with FPCUs was far more prevalent and widespread than 
has been commonly assumed. Edmonson’s campaign over a short period of time 
created national alliances with individuals and institutions who launched their own 
efforts. Their separate initiatives, by extension, offer promising opportunities for 
further historical research.65
For historians of capitalism, Edmonson’s observations about ignorance-making 
advance our understanding in two ways. First, ignorance offers a more satisfactory 
explanation for the rapid rise of industries like for-profit colleges than explanations 
based on economic rationalism. Ignorance, rather than reason and enlightened self-
interest, guided the decision-making of veterans and lawmakers. As such, agnotology 
establishes a promising new frontier for historians of capitalism interested in explor-
ing alternatives to standard ideas about market forces and the distribution of scarce 
resources. Second, ignorance-making as described by Edmonson can inform ongoing 
discussions among historians about the need to study capitalism “from the bottom 
up” and from “multiple angles using multiple methodologies.”66 As these scholars 
expand their horizons beyond relationships among business, labour, and the state, 
ignorance-making presents new research opportunities focused on students, educa-
tion policy-makers, and for-profit college owners. The history of capitalism, in short, 
would be incomplete without an understanding of FPCUs as well as of those patterns 
of ignorance that fuelled the sector’s development. The mid-twentieth-century cam-
paign against for-profits provides a starting point for advancing historical analyses in 
both areas.
For agnotologists, the mid-century crusade outlines yet another critical instance 
of ignorance as a motivating historical factor. It highlights the utility of education as 
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a site for exploring ignorance-making, especially for those who associate agnotology 
with science and public health controversies.67 Edmonson’s campaign was fundamen-
tally a battle against ignorance-making. He was motivated by the idea of protecting 
unsuspecting veterans. Agnotologists would define this group of students as naive 
and unaware of the predatory practices employed by the FPCU sector. Edmonson 
decried state governments for recognizing for-profit college problems and failing to 
adequately respond to or look into the matter. Agnotologists would view the absence 
of state-level investigations into FPCUs as a form of passively maintained ignorance. 
And the for-profit college fraud itself, in its deliberate and systematic forms, aligns 
squarely with the agnotological category of active ignorance production. For these 
reasons, Edmonson’s mid-twentieth-century campaign captures all three primary 
forms of socially constructed ignorance recognized by researchers in the field. The 
significance for historical analysis is that while agnotologists have valorized the study 
of fraud, deception, and other ignorance-related topics, historians of higher educa-
tion have tended to marginalize such topics as secondary to more compelling narra-
tives. As a result, the fraud-based strategies of for-profit colleges have until recently 
appeared on the historical margins as the work of outliers or the practices of a few 
bad apples.68 Agnotology revises and remakes this history by interpreting ignorance-
making as the motivating factor driving one of the first nationwide campaigns against 
for-profits in the US. This episode adds to the now-vibrant literature on ignorance-
making as a prime agent — one as powerful as social movements, economic crises, 
political conflicts, and intellectual advances — in shaping the course of the past and 
present. Edmonson’s campaign identified patterns of ignorance production, diffu-
sion, maintenance, and regulation that have contributed to the rise of today’s $35 
billion FPCU industry.69
What Edmonson learned, and what subsequent generations have had to relearn, 
was that the profit motive in higher education creates significant conflicts of inter-
est. Edmonson observed how these conflicts played out when for-profits focused 
on short-cuts and oversold promises of gainful employment. In recent years, these 
strategies have reappeared in surprisingly similar forms that have benefited FPCU 
owners at the expense of students and the public trust. Consider the recent and 
pending litigation against such companies as Corinthian, Kaplan, Career Education 
Corporation, Education Management Corporation, and Trump University. Students, 
whistleblowers, and shareholders have filed complaints against these institutions for 
false claims and misleading statements — what agnotologists describe as active ig-
norance production.70 Edmonson recognized the active ignorance-making strategies 
associated with these kinds of institutions when he called for protecting the public 
from fraudulent schools and colleges. This problem became the primary focus of his 
final campaign. He tapped into a timeless public unease with ignorance-making and 
the profit motive, and his efforts rallied one of the most formidable challenges to the 
sector in FPCU history.
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